En este ar tícu lo el au tor sos tie ne que el "cons ti tu cio na lis mo del ár bol vivien te" de Wa lu chow cons ti tu ye una "re vo lu ción co per ni ca na en nues tro pen sa mien to", dado que pro por cio na no sólo una teo ría del ju di cial review, sino una teo ría ge ne ral del ju di cial re view y de la de mo cra cia. No obs tan te que el au tor coin ci de en que en esta teo ría de Wa lu chow exis te un lu gar para una me to do lo gía del com mon law, dis cre pa en ca rac te rizar la como una que va de "aba jo ha cia arri ba". Por lo tan to, el ob je ti vo del ar tícu lo es re sal tar la im por tan cia del ar gu men to prin ci pal del li bro A Com mon Law Theory of Ju di cial Re view: The Li ving Tree por me dio del cual se in ten ta pro por cio nar un me jor en ten di mien to de las ga ran tías indi vi dua les y del ju di cial re view, pero ad ver tir una con se cuen cia in ne ce saria, es de cir, re du cir la ex pli ca ción a una me to do lo gía del com mon law de "aba jo ha cia arri ba". A su vez el au tor pre ten de pro por cio nar una co rrección ami ga ble: iden ti fi car la mo ra li dad po lí ti ca cons ti tu cio nal de la comu ni dad a tra vés de un mé to do que es tan to de "aba jo ha cia arri ba" como de "arri ba ha cia aba jo", me to do lo gía que se en cuen tra im plí ci ta en el li bro de Wa lu chow.
Ac cord ingly, since noth ing pre vents the earth from mov ing, I sug gest that we should now con sider also whether sev eral mo tions suit it, so that it can be re garded as one of the plan ets. For, it is not the cen ter of all the rev o lu tions.
Nicolaus 213) is one of the am bi tions of this ar ti cle. Let me ad vance my hunch that it is in deed so and clar ify that it is be cause "The Liv ing Tree" is not merely "A Common Law The ory of Ju di cial Re view", but much more than that "A Gen eral The ory of Ju di cial Re view and of Con sti tu -tional De moc racy". And as such it is a so phis ti cated ver sion of "Constitutionalism" ca pa ble of rec on cil ing two competing needs: fixity and flexibility. Ac cord ingly, I in tend: in the fol low ing two sec tions (II and III), to praise dif fer ent as pects of his book; in the fol low ing one (IV), to ap praise what I con sider to be an un nec es sary de vi a tion that might have de railed him from his ob jec tive -or at least slowed down his move ments to ward it; in the next two (V and VI), to raise his orig i nal route with what I con sider to be a better trail to get him back railed on the right track; and, in the last one (VII), to re pro duce our main con clu sion and en hance it with two questions for further inquiry.
In other words, I pre tend: (1) to de pict his main as pi ration, i.e. to pro vide a better un der stand ing of Charters and Ju di cial Re view in a Con sti tu tional De moc racy by "the living tree" met a phor; (2) to dis ap prove of an un war ranted claim, i.e. to re duce "the liv ing tree" met a phor to the common law bot tom-up meth od ol ogy; and (3) to re-de velop his al ter na tive with a friendly amend ment, i.e. to iden tify the com mu nity's con sti tu tional po lit i cal mo ral ity via, a method that is both bot tom-up and top-down, which is al ready explicit -or at least im plicit-on it: not only by judges but also by leg is la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re formers, and other le gal of fi cials and op er a tors, as well as by law yers and cit i zens, in a division of labour, which at the end will grant him the point.
II. "THE LIVING TREE" METAPHOR I ap plaud the "liv ing tree" met a phor as draw ing the picture of a "liv ing con sti tu tion" be yond the given por trait of a "dy namic con sti tu tion". 2 A dis tinc tion is help ful: al though, 40 IMER B. FLORES liv ing be ings/things and non-liv ing be ings/things can be more or less dy namic, the lat ter are much more lim ited than the for mer. A ma chine can be set in mo tion and stopped, i.e. turned on and turned off, by some one or something, in more or less ex pected and fore seen ways, whereas an or gan ism has a life of its own and so is ca pa ble of (re)act ing in dif fer ent un ex pected and un fore seen ways. Appro pri ately, we can fore cast -with a higher de gree of certainty as an al most ac cu rate pre dic tion-what will hap pen to a mech a nism, which has just been re placed a piece; while we can only fore tell -with a lower de gree of prob a bility as a more or less ap prox i mate proph ecy-what will happen to a pa tient, who has just been trans planted an or gan. 3 
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cism mainly from the originalists-the "liv ing con sti tu tion" as por trayed in the "living tree" anal ogy. 893 (1990) , on the other. 3 Else where I have pointed out the in trin sic lim i ta tions of think ing of law -and for that pur pose the con sti tu tion and its re con sti tu tion via con sti tu tional reenactments and amend ments or re forms-in merely me chanic-phys i cal terms. Vid. Flores, Imer B., "Re con sti tut ing Con sti tu tions -In sti tu tions and Cul ture. The Mex i can Con sti tu tion and NAFTA: Hu man Rights vis à vis Com merce", 17 Florida Fol low ing the dis tinc tion we can aptly say that the consti tu tion is "a tree that is very much alive" (69) -and I might add-"and kick ing" -to fol low one of Pro fes sor Jack M. Balkin's in di ca tions. 4 It is a "liv ing thing" and ca pa ble of "or ganic growth", i.e. "a liv ing tree ca pa ble of growth and ex pan sion within its nat u ral lim its" (183); and, as a con sequence, a con sti tu tion is "an in stru ment that must, within lim its in her ent in its con sti tu tional role, be al lowed to grow and adapt to new con tem po rary cir cum stances and evolving nor ma tive be liefs, in clud ing those about jus tice" (id.). 5 In a nut shell, it is a tree which has not only fixed and stable (or en trenched and writ ten) roots as a mod est and tenta tive pre-com mit ment, but also flex i ble and adapt able branches to be con tin u ously re-fixed (or to be re-entrenched and re-writ ten) as a fur ther com mit ment that dialec ti cally and dialogically will serve as a still modest and tentative pre-commitment, and so on.
Vid. Beard, Charles A., "The Liv ing Con sti tu tion", 185 An nals of the Amer i can As so ci a tion of Po lit i cal and So cial Sci ences, 29 (1936); Fallon Jr., Richard H., The Dy namic Con sti tu tion. An In tro duc tion to Amer i can Con sti tu tional Law
Let me bring to mind that "the liv ing tree" met a phor was in tro duced by Lord John Sankey in Ed wards v. At tor ney Gen eral of Can ada, 6 also known as the "Per sons Case". This case was de cided in 1930 by the Ju di cial Com mit tee of the Privy Coun cil of the United King dom, as the high est court of ap peals for sev eral in de pend ent Com mon wealth countries. It rec og nized for Ca na di ans as al ready im plicit in Cana dian Law "some thing like the right to equal ity be fore and un der the law" (2). By the by, its in te gra tion took place more than half a cen tury be fore its ex plicit in clu sion or incor po ra tion in the Ca na dian Char ter of Rights and Freedoms, as Part I of the Con sti tu tion Act, in 1982. 7 More over, the no tion of the "liv ing con sti tu tion" as a "living tree" can be traced back to Chief Jus tice John Mar shall, who in McCulloch v. Mary land (1819) re called the na ture of the con sti tu tion and its in ter pre ta tion: "[W]e must never for get that it is a con sti tu tion we are ex pound ing… [a consti tu tion does not] par take of the pro lix ity of a le gal code… a con sti tu tion, in tended to en dure for ages to come, and, con se quently, to be adapted to the var i ous cri ses of hu man 43 THE LIVING TREE CONSTITUTIONALISM: FIXITY AND FLEXIBILITY 7 Can ada has by now -to use Ros coe Pound's cat e go ri za tion-the first 25 years of a liv ing con sti tu tion "in books" but more than 75 years of a liv ing con sti tution "in ac tion". Vid. Pound, Ros coe, "Law in Books and Law in Ac tion", 44 Amer ican Law Re view, 12 (1910) .
My guess is that the fact that "most of the rights in cluded in the Char ter en joyed, in some form or other, rec og ni tion in Ca na dian law be fore the in tro duc tion of the Char ter" fal si fies both ex clu sive and in clu sive le gal pos i tiv ism al to gether by demon strat ing both that law does nei ther ex clude nec es sary ref er ences to mo ral ity as a cri te ria for le gal va lid ity nor merely may in clude/in cor po rate con tin gent ref erences, but that law re ally in cludes/in cor po rates or even, for short, in te grates neces sary ref er ences to mo ral ity, i.e. in this case to prin ci ples and rights, at least implicit and long be fore its ex plicit rec og ni tion. The fact that law in te grates nec es sary ref er ences to mo ral ity, there fore, does en tail that law must in te grate such ref erences and does not mean that law is ex hausted by those ref er ences. How come exclu sive and in clu sive le gal positivists ex plain that Ca na dian law in te grated as already im plicit by 1930, most -or even some-of the rights rec og nized as ex plicit un til 1982? In my opin ion, it nei ther is a con tin gency or par tic u lar ity of some le gal sys tems, such as the Ca na dian or those that be long to the com mon law tra di tion, nor is an ex er cise of a di rected power to cre ate or in vent new law, but a ne ces sity or gen er al ity of all le gal sys tems to rec re ate or in ter pret the al ready ex ist ing law: if a le gal sys tem rec og nizes a pre rog a tive or right to a spe cific group or kind of per sons such as "men" and there is not only the same rea son to in te grate "women" into that group or kind but also no jus ti fied rea son (func tion ing as a con straint or re straint) for not do ing so, the le gal sys tem not even tu ally may in clude/in cor po rate but ac tually must in te grate -or in te grates-them as al ready im plicit bear hold ers of such pre rog a tive or right fol low ing the Latin ada gio ubi eadem ra tio, ibi eadem iuris dispositio.
I am very grate ful to Brian Burge-Hendrix for push ing me to clar ify this point. When we are dea ling with words that are also a cons ti tuent act, like the Cons ti tu tion of the Uni ted Sta tes, we must rea lize that they have ca lled into life a being the de ve lop ment of which could not have been fo re seen com ple tely by the most gif ted of its be get ters. It was enough for them to rea li ze or to hope that they had crea ted an or ga nism; it has ta ken a century and has cost their suc ces sors much sweat and blood to pro ve that they crea ted a na tion. The case be fo re us must be con si de red in the light of our who le ex pe rien ce and not merely of what was said a hun dred years ago. by the Cases by C.C. Langdell): "Mr. Langdell's ideal in the law, the end of all his striv ing, is the elegantia juris, or log i cal in teg rity of the sys tem as a sys tem. He is per haps the great est liv ing theo lo gian. But as a theo lo gian he is less con cerned with his pos tu lates than to show that the con clu sions from them hang to gether... so en tirely is he in ter ested in the for mal con nec tion of things, or logic, as dis tin guished from the feel ings which make the con tent of logic, and which ac tu ally shaped the sub stance of the law. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been ex pe ri ence. The seed of ev ery new growth within its sphere has been felt ne ces sity. The form of con ti nu ity has been kept up by reasonings pur porting to re duce ev ery thing to a log i cal se quence; but that form is noth ing but the evening dress which the new-comer puts on to make it self pre sent able ac cord ing to con ven tional re quire ments. The im por tant phe nom e non is the man un der neath it, not the coat; the jus tice and rea son able ness of a de ci sion, not its con sis tency with pre vi ously held views." (Em pha sis added.) And Holmes Jr., Ol i ver Wendell, The Com mon Law, 1 (1881): "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been ex pe rience."
Law must be sta ble and yet it can not stand still. Hence all think ing about law has strug gled to rec on cile the con flict ing de mands of the need of sta bil ity and of the need of change. The so cial in ter est in the gen eral se cu rity has led men to seek some fixed ba sis for an ab so lute or der ing of hu man action whereby a firm and sta ble so cial or der might be assured. But con tin ual changes in the cir cum stances of so cial life de mand con tin ual new ad just ments to the pres sure of other so cial in ter ests as well as to new modes of en dan ger ing se cu rity. Thus the le gal or der must be flex i ble as well as stable. It must be over hauled con tin u ally and re fit ted con tin ually to the changes in the ac tual life which it is to gov ern. If we seek prin ci ples, we must seek prin ci ples of change no less than prin ci ples of sta bil ity. Ac cord ingly the chief problem to which le gal think ers have ad dressed them selves has been how to rec on cile the idea of a fixed body of law, af fording no scope for in di vid ual wil ful ness, with the idea of change and growth and mak ing of new law.
Sim i larly, Jus tice Benjamin N. Cardozo, in The Growth of the Law -the se quel to his fa mous The Na ture of the Ju dicial Pro cess-for mu lated: "The law of our day faces a twofold need. The first is the need of some re state ment that will bring cer tainty and or der out of the wil der ness of pre cedent. This is the task of le gal sci ence. The sec ond is the need of a phi los o phy that will me di ate be tween the con flicting claims of sta bil ity and prog ress, and sup ply a prin ci ple of growth." 12 And, fi nally, it was H.L.A. Hart who re ca pit ulated: 13 In fact all sys tems, in dif fer ent ways, com pro mise be tween two so cial needs: the need for cer tain rules which can, over great ar eas of con duct, safely be ap plied by pri vate in di vid uals to them selves with out fresh of fi cial guid ance or weigh ing up of so cial is sues, and the need to leave open, for lat ter settle ment by an in formed, of fi cial choice, is sues which can 45 THE LIVING TREE CONSTITUTIONALISM: FIXITY AND FLEXIBILITY only be prop erly ap pre ci ated and set tled when they arise in a con crete case.
To sum ma rize the im por tance of the idea and im pli cations of find ing a bal ance or equi lib rium be tween the compet ing needs for fix ity and flex i bil ity, i.e. the Co per ni can rev o lu tion claimed by Waluchow, let me cite him: "The living tree con cep tion brings these two ap proaches to gether into a kind of com mon law un der stand ing of Charters -one that seeks to com bine both the rel a tive fix ity of en trenched, writ ten law and the rel a tive adapt abil ity [i.e. flex i bil ity] characteristic of the common law." (183) III. TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CHARTERS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE DEBATE
In the book Waluchow ad dresses two sets of dif fer ent, but con nected, ques tions re lated to the role and de sir abil ity of both Charters and Ju di cial Re view in a Con sti tu tional De moc racy (13) and as a re sult, an a lyt i cally, sep a rates four ques tions (128). Fur ther more, the book is di vided into two parts: the first con sist ing of Chap ters 1 to 4, where he frames -or re-frames-the de bate; and, the sec ond contain ing Chap ters 5 and 6, where he fos ters his al ter na tive. Let me re peat that in this sec tion we will an a lyze some aspects re lated to his fram ing -or reframing-of the de bate and in the fol low ing ones we will crit i cize his al ter na tive, at least some thing in its core, and rec og nize an al ter nate route to it. It is worth men tion ing that it con tains help ful an a lyt ical dis tinc tions to un der stand the importance of the debate and the need to transcend it.
On the one hand, from the dif fer ent dis tinc tions made by Waluchow -such as Rex-Re gina (20-21), sov er eign/ gov ernment (20-21, 25-27), (con sti tu tion ally) lim ited/un lim ited (19-21), sub stan tive lim its/pro ce dural re quire ments (22), con sti tu tional law/con sti tu tional con ven tion (28-30), nor mative/de facto free dom (36-37), en trenched/non-en trenched 46 rules (41-46), writ ten/un writ ten rules (47-52), con sti tu tional in ter pre ta tion/con sti tu tional the o ries (52-73), Regas/De mos (76-79), rep re sen ta tive de moc racy/con sti tu tional de moc racy (79-81), Her cu les/ Ulys ses, re-la belled here as Atticus (97-99, 103-106, 109-115), 14 Athenia/Ve nu sians (97-99), pro ce dural con cep tion of de moc racy/con sti tu tional con ception of de moc racy (106-109), au then tic or gen u ine wishes/ unauthentic or not gen u ine ones (85-91), ex pressed wishes/ best in ter ests (91-97), moral com mit ments/moral opin ions (225-226), peo ple-then/peo ple-now (18, 136), tacit/hy pothet i cal con sent (142), top-down/bot tom-up meth od ol o gies (204-208), hubristic/hum-ble mes sages (246) and so onin the com ing para graphs I will ac cen tu ate two dis tinct sets.
In the first, by ac knowl edg ing that a sov er eign must be "con sti tu tion ally un lim ited" 15 and a gov ern ment can be "constitutionally lim ited" (24), Waluchow in di cates that it is pos si ble to dif fer en ti ate two dis tinct kinds of sov er eigns embod ied by Rex (i.e. an un lim ited sov er eign with a con sti tution ally un lim ited gov ern ment) and Re gina (i.e. an un limited sov er eign with a con sti tu tion ally lim ited gov ern ment): "Re gina has all the pow ers pos sessed by Rex, ex cept that she lacks au thor ity to leg is late on mat ters con cern ing re li -47 THE LIVING TREE CONSTITUTIONALISM: FIXITY AND FLEXIBILITY 14 On be half of Atticus Finch, i.e. the main char ac ter of the fic tional novel of Lee, Harper, To Kill the Mock ing bird (1960), a law yer, bru tally hon est, highly moral, and a tire less cru sader for good causes -even hope less ones. Al though I am sympa thetic with the idea of le gal of fi cials, in clud ing law yers and cit i zens, re sem bling Atticus Finch's highly eth i cal and moral ap proach to law, I fear that both leg is lators are not -or do not tend to be-as him and judges are not -or do not tend to be-like him. In short, we must as sume that they nei ther are nor need to be Atticus. 15 Vid. Hobbes, Thomas, Le vi a than, Ch. 29, 224 (Rich ard Tuck ed., 1991): "For to be sub ject to Lawes, is to be sub ject to the Com mon-wealth, that is to the Soveraign Rep re sen ta tive, that is to himselfe; which is not sub jec tion, but freedome from the Lawes. Which errour, be cause it setteth the Lawes above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to pun ish him; which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same rea son a third, to pun ish the second; and so con tin u ally with out end, to the Conusion, and Dis so lu tion of the Common-wealth." Vid. also Aus tin, John, The Prov ince of Ju ris pru dence De ter mined, 254 (1954): "Su preme power lim ited by pos i tive law, is a flat con tra dic tion in terms." gion, and on any day ex cept Wednes day." (21) As he highlights (25):
[W]e can co her ently go on to speak of lim ited gov ern ment cou pled with un lim ited sov er eignty. This is pre sum ably what one should say about con sti tu tional de moc ra cies wherein the peo ple's sov er eign au thor ity -what is usu ally termed "pop u lar sov er eignty"-is said to be un lim ited but the govern ment bod ies -for ex am ple, Par lia ment or Con gressthrough whom that sov er eignty is ex er cised on the peo ple's be half is thought to be con sti tu tion ally lim ited… And, as he later un der lines (37): Re gina might be said to ex er cise lim ited gov ern ment powers on be half of an un lim ited sov er eign peo ple who have entrusted her with var i ous re spon si bil i ties… such pic ture under lies the tra di tional con cep tion of con sti tu tional democracies ac cord ing to which gov ern ment is held, in trust, by the var i ous or gans of gov ern ment that are ex pected to ob serve a va ri ety of con sti tu tional lim its. Fail ure to ob serve the required lim its will nul lify any at tempt to ex er cise gov ern ment power.
The ex is tence of both sub stan tive lim i ta tions (i.e. not legis lat ing on mat ters con cern ing re li gion) and pro ce dural limits (i.e. leg is lat ing on any day ex cept Wednes day) re in forces an idea cen tral to constitutionalism, such as the idea of a con sti tu tion ally lim ited gov ern ment: "This is the idea… that gov ern ment can and should be le gally lim ited in its pow ers, and that its au thor ity de pends on its ob serv ing these limits" (9) and that "a con sti tu tion con sists of one or more rules or norms con sti tut ing, and de fin ing the lim its (if any) of, gov ern ment au thor ity." (19) In other words, in de moc racies the power of the gov ern ment and of the ma jor ity can be lim ited by the con sti tu tion, when it im poses both ex plicit sub stan tive con straints on what can be de cided and procedural restraints on how to decide and who is entitled to do it.
But the open ques tions are: (1) can there be a truly unlim ited sov er eign with a con sti tu tion ally un lim ited gov ern -48 ment, such as the one em bod ied by Rex?; and (2) are there im plicit lim its to which an un lim ited sov er eign is sub jected while gov ern ing, to the ex tent that all gov ern ment is per definitio lim ited, es pe cially un der a con sti tu tion? To an swer to both let me call your at ten tion to the mem o ra ble Sunday morn ing of the 10th of No vem ber 1612, in which the judges of Eng land were sum moned be fore King James I upon complaint of the Arch bishop of Can ter bury to ex pound the alleged royal pre rog a tive of the king to take away from the judges any cause he pleased and de cided it him self, fol lowing the Latin ad age: Quod principi placuit vigorem legis habet (i.e. "What ever pleases the prince has the force of law"), as Pound re called: 16 To this Coke an swered on be half of the judges, that by the law of Eng land the king in per son could not ad judge any cause; all cases, civil and crim i nal, were to be de ter mined in some court of jus tice ac cord ing to the law and cus tom of the realm. "But," said the king, "I thought law was founded upon rea son, and I and oth ers have rea son as well as the judges." "True it was," Coke re sponded, "that God has en dowed his Maj esty with ex cel lent sci ence and great en dow ments of nature; but his Maj esty was not learned in the laws of his realm of Eng land, and causes which con cern the life or inher i tance or goods or for tunes of his sub jects are not to be de cided by nat u ral rea son, but by the ar ti fi cial rea son and judg ment of the law, which law is an art which re quires long study and ex pe ri ence be fore that a man can at tain to the cog ni zance of it." At this the king was much of fended, say ing that in such case he should be un der the law, which it was trea son to af firm. Coke an swered in the words at trib uted to Bracton, that the king ought not to be un der any man but un der God and the law [, i.e. non sub homine sed sub Deo et lege].
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In the sec ond, with the dis tinc tions be tween ex pressed wishes/best in ter ests, au then tic or gen u ine wishes/ unauthentic or not gen u ine ones, and moral com mitments/moral opin ions, Waluchow in sin u ates that a judge is not re quired to de fer to the inauthentic moral opin ions of the com mu nity -and even of the ma jor ity-but only to follow the au then tic moral com mit ments of it -and even of they-not his or her own. By the same to ken, a leg is la tor is not re quired to abide by the inauthentic moral opin ions of the com mu nity -and even of the ma jor ity-but only to adhere to its -and even their-authentic moral com mitments.
To re in force his dis tinc tions and the con di tions that must be met, Waluchow in vites us: first, in the case of a pa tient, who is fully in formed about her med i cal con di tion and the op tions avail able, but that opts to say that she wants to die, to con sider that (87):
[A] daugh ter is moved to de clare: "I know what she just said, but that can't be my mother talk ing! She says she wants to die, but she has al ways firmly be lieved in a duty to God to pre serve one's life at all costs. To sur ren der to death in this way would be, in her eyes, to in sult God -some thing she would never, ever wish to do." In such a case, the pa tient might be de scribed as speak ing out of char ac ter. One might go so far as to say that in such cases of "evaluative dis sonance" it is "her con di tion" speak ing, not her. If so, then one might be in clined to say that her con sent can not pos si bly be valid be cause it is inauthentic.
And, sec ond, to sup pose the case of some one in a drunken state, who de spite of be ing fully aware of the risks in volved in drunk driv ing and the ex tent to which such conduct vi o lates his fun da men tal con vic tions and set tled prefer ences ex presses his de sire to drive him self home driven by a tem po rary, drink-en hanced, ma cho pref er ence or impulse to get him self home un der his own steam, but since that is an inauthentic wish his friends are jus ti fied not only 50 in dis count ing or ig nor ing it but also in tak ing the car keys away to prevent him from driving (88-90).
In a sim i lar way, the duty of leg is la tors -and mu ta tis mutando of judges-is to fol low the au then tic moral commit ments of the cit i zens, i.e. ob jec tive prin ci ples, and not their own sub jec tive pref er ences. Rep re sen ta tives have an ob li ga tion to vote "as con stit u ents would have voted un der ideal con di tions of de lib er a tion -that is, with full knowledge of all rel e vant facts, and in the ab sence of prej u dice or other fac tors that can cloud judg ment, and so on" and "in what ever way is likely to ad vance the overall interests of her constituents" (16).
For this rea son, their duty is not merely to fol low expressed wishes of the com mu nity -and even of the ma jority-be cause those wishes not only may be harm ful to it -or at least to a sig nif i cant part of it such as a mi nor itybased on the no tion of max i miz ing the util ity of the ma jor ity and min i miz ing the one of the mi nor ity by ap peal ing to the "great est good of the great est num ber", the so-called "tyranny of the ma jor ity", but also may be based in "sim ple prej u dice" and even "fear of the other/un known" (99-103). In fact, as Waluchow ac cen tu ates, on one side, for leg is lators (104): "Given all this, it seems quite rea son able to think that Atticus will deny that his duty lies in fol low ing the ex pressed wishes of his con stit u ents. Only a naïve view of a rep re sen ta tive's role would lead him to think oth erwise." And, emphasizes, on the other, for judges (230):
In ru ling against a go vern ment ac tion (e.g. a sta tu te or ju dicial ru ling) that has the sup port of po pu lar mo ral opi nion, jud ges might ac tually be en for cing, not thwar ting, the commu nity's very own po li ti cal mo ra lity [i.e. mo ral com mitment]… and a court, in up hol ding the se ele ments of the com mu nity's cons ti tu tio nal mo ra lity, will not only be res pecting the com mu nity's aut hen tic wis hes and com mit ments, it will in fact be up hol ding the law.
To re view the tran scen dence of this idea and its ap pli cabil ity to both leg is la tors and judges, i.e. the Co per ni can rev -51 o lu tion claimed by Waluchow, let me, first, draw a par al lel: Did Co per ni cus have to ac cept the ex plicit or ex pressed inauthentic opin ion of the com mu nity -and even of the major ity-re gard ing the vir tu ally unan i mous ac cep tance of the be lief that the mid dle of the uni verse is the earth or to as sume the im plicit or tacit au then tic com mit ment of the com mu nity -and even of both the ma jor ity and the mi nority-to truth, i.e. that the mid dle of the universe is the sun? And, now, quote him (237):
[T]he role of judges is not to bow to the inauthentic wishes of the ma jor ity and en force their mis guided moral opin ions and evaluative dis so nance, any more than it was Atticus's job to bow to the mis guide wishes of his con stit u ents. Their job is to re spect and en force the true com mit ments of the com munity's con sti tu tional mo ral ity in re flec tive equilibrium.
On the other hand, the book in cludes an ex haus tive and ex ten sive anal y sis and crit i cism of all the ar gu ments, claims, ex am ples, and ob jec tions, em bed ded in the standard case for Ju di cial Re view, as well of all coun ter-ar guments, coun ter-claims, coun ter-ex am ples, and coun ter-objec tions, im planted in the crit ics' case against it, such as the "Ar gu ment from De moc racy" and the "Ar gu ment from Dis agree ment". The for mer im plies that "Dem o cratic prin ciple is se ri ously com pro mised if unelected and po lit i cally unac count able judges are left with the task of flesh ing out the con tours of the moral rights the Char ter claims to guar antee, and then ap ply ing these rights against leg is la tion duly passed by dem o crat i cally ac count able bod ies like Par liament and the pro vin cial leg is la tures" (3-4). 17 The lat ter invites us to be lieve that "Yet if mem bers of a com mu nity can not agree, at any par tic u lar mo ment in time, let alone across gen er a tions, on the na ture and con tent of the moral rights en shrined in their Char ter, they can not in tel li gi bly pre-com mit to the sta ble, fixed point of con sti tu tional lim its within which gov ern ment power is sup posed to be ex er cised on their be half." (125) 18 In fact, it is hard to imag ine, even one sin gle ar gu ment, claim, ex am ple, or ob jec tion and their cor re spond ing counter-ar gu ment, coun ter-claim, coun ter-ex am ple, or coun terob jec tion, made by both the ad vo cates and the crit ics of writ ten en trenched Charters and Ju di cial Re view, such as Ron ald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron, re spec tively, or any other au thors known, left out. 19 Af ter an ex po si tion of both the stan dard case and the crit ics' case, Waluchow starts an ex plo ra tion of the pos si ble routes for an on go ing de bate. In stead of talk ing past each other as no threat or thwart has been im posed unto the road, he de cided -rather than tak ing a long de tour or a short-cut tak ing him no where-to face the dan gers and obstruc tions block ing the road ahead. Faced with the op tion of aban don ing en trenched writ ten Charters and Ju di cial Re view al to gether as Waldron ad vised -or at least somewhat as Tom Camp bell ad vo cated, by adopt ing a leg is la tive Bill of Rights to be en forced not by courts but by leg is latures- 20 Waluchow fos ters an al ter na tive to it, which consti tutes "a better un der stand ing of the na ture and role of… [ (1999) . 20 Cfr. Camp bell, Tom, "Leg is lat ing Hu man Rights", in The The ory and Prac tice of Leg is la tion: Es says on Legisprudence, su pra note 16, at 219. Even though, Waluchow does not ex pressly ad dress the is sue there are hints that he does tac itly re ject the al ter na tive, by re fer ring to At tor ney Gen eral of Can ada v. Lavell, S.C.R. 1349 (1974) as a case "some times cited as ev i dence that a purely stat u tory nonconstitutional Bill of Rights is an in ef fec tive tool for the pro tec tion of rights." (3 fn 9).
IV. WALUCHOW'S ALTERNATIVE: A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
From my point of view Waluchow's al ter na tive is very appeal ing, count ing most of the pre mises and con clu sions. How ever, I have a small prob lem with one of the pre mises (some one might even think that it is a con clu sion in it self). My in tu ition is that this prem ise (or con clu sion) is un nec essary for the main ob jec tive. I re fer mainly to some thing within the core of the fifth chapter.
Through out the book Waluchow has been for mu lat ing pow er ful ar gu ments not only for a better un der stand ing of Charters Rights and Ju di cial Re view in a Rep re sen ta tive De moc racy (or for those hav ing a Pro ce dural Con cep tion of De moc racy) but also for lim ited gov ern ment in a Con sti tutional De moc racy (or for those hold ing a Con sti tu tional Con cep tion of De moc racy). In the lat ter, leg is la tion and adju di ca tion, leg is la tures and courts, and leg is la tors and judges are com pat i ble work ing with their re spec tive lim its and pow ers not merely func tion ing as a con trol on each other but coexisting as a complement in a division of labour.
More pre cisely, the prob lem is with cir cum scrib ing the alter na tive to the com mon law meth od ol ogy, which is char acter ized as a bot tom-up one to meet the chal lenge that disagree ment co mes all the way down: sug gest ing that it is pos si ble to re vise Char ter Rights by Ju di cial Re view at the point of their ap pli ca tion and to re-elab o rate them all the way up as judge made-law. The ap proach ech oes Hart's to-thecen tre moves -which re sem ble Ar is totle's mid dle term. Let me re phrase it: com mon law is re vis able at the point of appli ca tion, whereas stat u tory law is not. Char ter Rights, which re sem ble fixed stat u tory law in the sense that they are en trenched and writ ten, re quire a flex i ble ap pli ca tion sim i lar to the one of com mon law. Hence, the com mon law bot tom-up meth od ol ogy ap pears to be the way out. As I said, it seems to be all the way up to face dis agree ment all the way down. 54 But this is not the case. It might be in Great Brit ain, where an un-en trenched and un writ ten Char ter may be con structed all the way up by judges alone -as sum ing legis la tors nei ther had say nor will say (or have to say) noth ing at all-as judge made-law, but the idea of a purely common law constitutionalism is highly con test able even there. 21 Any way, in my opin ion, it is ab so lutely not the case for an en trenched writ ten one, in which leg is la tors, in cluding fram ers, amenders or re form ers, have a say: they have al ready said some thing and are en ti tled to say something else.
Bear in mind that in most coun tries Bills of Rights are, now a days, not only both en trenched and writ ten but also en forced, ap par ently, in com mon law coun tries with a purely com mon law meth od ol ogy fa mil iar to them. And, argu ably, by those un fa mil iar prima fa cie to such meth od ology, with a some what dif fer ent one: 1) in non-com mon law coun tries, such as civil law ones, for ex am ple, Ger many, Italy and Spain, as well as Ar gen tina, Co lom bia and México; 2) in the rest of the world, by re gional courts on hu man rights, such as the Eu ro pean, the Inter-Amer i can and the Af ri can; and, 3) in parts of com mon law coun tries with civil law back grounds, for in stance, Lou i si ana in the United States of America and Quebec in Canada.
Not with stand ing, it is clear that the dif fer ences be tween the com mon law and the civil law sys tems, to gether with their re spec tive meth od ol o gies, tend to be ex ag ger ated, over drawn and over stated, whilst both sys tems are get ting closer and re sem ble each other more ev ery day. It might be ar gued, fol low ing Hart, that the for mer is more flex i ble than fixed, while the later is more fixed than flex i ble. But both, in deal ing with pre ce dents, have found a com pro mise between these two com pet ing needs for fix ity and flex i bil ity. That's why it is pos si ble to be think ing of a shared meth odol ogy and a much more sim i lar method of rea son ing all across the board. It is, cer tainly, "some thing like" the common law, but not the com mon law per se. In other words, it is some thing that all sys tems have in com mon or share -even though it is not nec es sar ily the com mon law bottom-up meth od ol ogy as such. How come those who are not versed in the common law methodology ended applying it?
I con sider the use of the term "com mon law", es pe cially in the ti tle of the book, un for tu nate for be ing con fus ing and mis lead ing. The "com mon law" means ei ther "judge madelaw", "cus tom of the whole realm" (i.e. the Brit ish Com monwealth, its col o nies and ter ri to ries), and/or "com mon reason". 22 In my opin ion, en trenched and writ ten Char ter Rights are nei ther purely judge made-law (i.e. bot tom-up meth od ol ogy) nor can be cir cum scribed only to the com mon law coun tries, though the third sense can not be ruled out com pletely. It re ally im plies "some thing like" a "com mon reason" such as Ed ward Coke's "ar ti fi cial rea son", which main fea tures are char ac ter ized by Ger ald Postema as: 1) pragmatic, 2) con tex tual, 3) nonsystematic, 4) discoursive, and 5) com mon or shared. 23 But, it is far from be ing con clu sive that now a days en trenched and writ ten Char ter Rights are still non-sys tem atic or wholly prag matic.
Any way, for the pur pose of iden ti fy ing the puz zling common law fea tures, Waluchow quotes a précis made by Fred The Na ture of the Com mon Law (197) . 24 In short, the rules of the com mon law: (1a) are no where canonically for mu lated or there is no sin gle au thor i ta tive for mu la tion; (2a) are not made by leg is la tures, but by courts; (3a) are cre ated by courts in the very pro cess of ap pli ca tion (and ap plied ret roac tively to facts aris ing prior to the es tab lish ment of the rule); and (4a) are not only cre ated in ter sti tially but also mod i fied or re placed when their ap pli ca tion would generate a malignant result in the case at hand.
To the con trary, in my per spec tive, Char ter Rights: (1b) are ev ery where for mu lated, with open tex ture and vague terms that def i nitely do not pro vide a sin gle straight for ward au thor i ta tive for mu la tion; (2b) are nei ther made by leg is latures nor by courts alone, but drafted firstly into an author i ta tive source such as the Con sti tu tion and the Bill of Rights, or in cor po rated to them by means of con sti tu tional con ven tions and con sti tu tional amend ments or re forms by its fram ers, amenders or re form ers, and un ques tion ably rede fined or re made by both leg is la tures and courts, via leg isla tion and its ap pli ca tion-in ter pre ta tion in the pro cess of ad ju di ca tion; (3b) are not cre ated out of the blue by courts in the pro cess of ap pli ca tion (and thus not nec es sar ily applied ret ro ac tively), but surely re vis able by them at the point of ap pli ca tion; and (4b) are nei ther cre ated in ter stitially nor mod i fied or re placed, when their application would generate a malignant result in the case at hand -or at least not necessarily.
To prove these points, let me call to mind that the Con stitu tion of the United States of Amer ica (1789) and the Bill of Rights (1791), orig i nally, did not say any thing about race and as such did not pro hibit slav ery; and, later, with Amend ments, i.e. 13th (1865), 14th (1868) and 15th (1870), not only pro hib ited slav ery but also granted equal rights and pro tected po lit i cal rights of ra cial groups. Nev er the less, the Su preme Court con tin ued to al low seg re ga tion and ra -57 cial dis crim i na tion, un der the cri te ria of "sep a rate, but equal" in Plessy v. Fer gu son (1896). 25 Not un til Brown v. Board of Ed u ca tion (1954), 26 the Court de clared that seg rega tion pro moted dis crim i na tion and later on or dered school de seg re ga tion. Col lat er ally, this de ci sion sparked leg is la tors and leg is la tures to cre ate af fir ma tive ac tion pro grams. These pro grams with de ci sions go ing back and forth have been held con sti tu tional, due to the ex is tence of a com pelling state in ter est, 27 tion, these programs were se verely lim ited by a de ci sion that re stricted dis tricts' abil ity to use race to as sign stu dents to school inte gra tion ef forts. The ques tion is whether this de ci sion will put an end to the Brown era and to af fir ma tive ac tion programs al to gether. Therefore, on this topic, as in any other, the discussion keeps going -and going-as the living tree keeps growing -and growing.
Fur ther more, the com mon law meth od ol ogy as such was not di rected to de let ing or sub tract ing rules from the system but to in sert ing and add ing other rules to it. As Jus tice Scalia stated "It should be ap par ent that by rea son of the doc trine of stare decisis… the com mon law grew in a pe culiar fash ion -rather like a Scrab ble board. No rule of de cision pre vi ously an nounced could be erased, but qual i fi cations could be added to it." 30 On the con trary, fol low ing 58 with the liv ing tree met a phor, it is pos si ble to prune or trim some branches, i.e. to cut off and cut out some rules.
So far, there is no con clu sive ar gu ment for sus tain ing that the com mon law bot tom-up meth od ol ogy is the de fining one un der ly ing Char ter cases. Some how it is true that by lack ing a sin gle straight for ward for mu la tion, due to the fact of be ing en acted -and re-en acted-with open tex ture and vague terms, Char ter Rights re quire not only to be constantly re vised at the point of ap pli ca tion in case-by-case sce nar ios and from time-to-time, but also de vel oped grad ually, incrementally and pro gres sively. Cer tainly, I am not rul ing out that "some thing like" the com mon law meth od ology -or at least par tially-plays a de fin ing part and a key role here and else where. Keep in mind Eisenberg in tro ductory re marks: 31 My pur po se here is to de ve lop the ins ti tu tio nal prin ci ples that go vern the way in which the com mon law is es ta blis hed in our so ciety [i.e. a Com mon Law country, such as the United Sta tes of Ame ri ca]. Much of our law de ri ves from ru les laid down in cons ti tu tions, sta tu tes, or ot her aut ho ri ta ti ve texts that the courts must in ter pret but may not re for mu late. The com mon law, in con trast, is the part of the law that is wit hin the pro vin ce of the courts them sel ves to es ta blish. In some areas of law, like torts and con tracts, com mon law rules pre do mi na te. In ot her areas, like cor po ra tions, they are ex tre mely im por tant. In all areas, even tho se that are ba sically cons ti tu tio nal or sta tu tory, they fi gu re at least in ters titially.
Ad di tion ally, I can hardly imag ine Waldron and Dworkin -or some one else for that ef fect-not com ing af ter Waluchow for his moves. On the one hand, Waldron -or any other critic-might hold him ac count able for not taking the leg is la tors and leg is la tures se ri ously by not ac commo dat ing them into the the ory. While con ced ing that Ju dicial Re view is ac cept able in sit u a tions that do not match his "core" case, he has still re jected the claim that judges are better po si tioned for moral in sight than leg is la tors: 32 But this is mostly a myth. By the time the cases reach the high ap pel late lev els we are mostly talk ing about in our disputes about ju di cial re view, al most all trace of the orig i nal flesh-and-blood right-hold ers has van ished, and ar gu ment such as it is re volves around ab stract is sue of the right in dis pute. Plain tiffs or pe ti tion ers are se lected by ad vo cacy groups pre cisely in or der to em body the ab stract char ac ter istics that the groups want to em pha size as part of a general public policy argument…
The pro cess of leg is la tion is open to con sid er ation of in divid ual cases, through lob by ing, in hear ings, and in de bate. In deed, there is a ten dency these days to ini ti ate leg is la tion on the ba sis of no to ri ous in di vid ual cases -Megan's Law, for ex am ple. Hard cases make bad law, it is some times said. To the ex tent that this is true, it seems to me that leg is la tures are much better po si tioned to mount an as sess ment of the sig nif i cance of an in di vid ual case in re la tion to a gen eral issue of rights that af fect mil lions and affects them in many different ways.
Why in sist on judges and courts as the one and only fi nal and in fal li ble sole law-mak ers or in ter pret ers of Char ter Rights? What about leg is la tors and leg is la tures? It does not suf fice to af firm: "The re sult [of mix ing Hart, Reaume, and Schauer] is our al ter na tive model of Charters and their legit i macy, the com mon law con cep tion, which in no way under mined by the cir cum stances of politics." (209) udges are better po si tioned for this kind of moral in sight than are leg is la tures be cause judges have moral thought ex per i ments pre sented to them ev ery day with the kind of de tail and con crete per sonal in volve ment needed for moral in sight. It is one thing to talk about a right to pri vacy in gen eral, an other to or der a teen ager to bear a child she does not want to bear. One might well think that moral in sight is best gen er ated at the level of par tic u lar cases, giv ing ju di cial be liefs greater epistemic au thor ity than that pos sessed by leg is la tive be liefs on the same sub ject."
On the other hand, Dworkin -or any other ad vo cate and even some critic-might hold him ac count able for ob scuring what judges and courts do by sug gest ing that it is all the way up flex i ble in ter pre ta tion with no fixed con straint or re straint: Is it re ally a bot tom-up meth od ol ogy, all the way up flex i ble in ter pre ta tion, re gard less of the fixed, i.e. en trenched and writ ten, char ac ter of Charters? I guess not. What's more, ad mit ting that would be like say ing that the liv ing tree grows from the flex i ble branches to wards the fixed roots and that will amount to throw ing the baby out with the bath water.
In few words, my claim has been that "The Liv ing Tree" is not merely "A Com mon Law The ory of Ju di cial Re view", since it is much more: "A Gen eral The ory of Ju di cial Re view and of Con sti tu tional De moc racy". On one side, it is a general the ory be yond the bound aries of the com mon law system and its bot tom-up meth od ol ogy; and, on the other, it is not lim ited to the role that judges play in Ju di cial Re view, but to their role in a Con sti tu tional De moc racy and its compat i bil ity with the one played by leg is la tors, in clud ing framers, amenders and re form ers, as well as other le gal of fi cials and operators, such as lawyers and citizens.
Waluchow can eas ily an swer to my ob jec tion by say ing that (1) he is in ter ested in de vel op ing a Com mon Law Theory of Ju di cial Re view for com mon law coun tries with a com mon law bot tom-up meth od ol ogy; and (2) he is in terested nei ther in a Gen eral The ory of Ju di cial Re view nor for it to be ap plied to a Con sti tu tional De moc racy. How ever, I am cer tain that it is to the con trary, since he is truly in terested in pro vid ing a better un der stand ing of Char ter Rights and Ju di cial Re view, i.e. a gen eral de scrip tion-ex pla na tion, to be ap plied all across the board. But why la bel it as a com mon law judge made-law bot tom-up meth od ol ogy, when it is nei ther truly so nor need to be the case? It might be "some thing like" the com mon law, but not per se. In other words, some thing shared in com mon by all le gal sys tems with -or with out-en trenched writ ten Charters Rights and 61 Ju di cial Re view. So, the quest for an amendment or reform to his alternative is indispensable.
V. AN AMENDMENT TO WALUCHOW'S ALTERNATIVE:
A GENERAL THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY?
My friendly amend ment, fol low ing Waluchow's Hartian move, can also be la belled as oc cu py ing the cen tre-mid dle. My claim is that, in Char ter cases, we start with the in terpre ta tion of the text, a fixed en trenched and writ ten Charter, but with open-tex ture and vague terms, some thing like a stat u tory law, top-down meth od ol ogy; and, then, only then, we con front it -at the point of ap pli ca tion-with "some thing like" a com mon law rea son, by ap ply ing the bottom-up meth od ol ogy, as Waluchow rightly claims.
It is nei ther all the way-down stat u tory law ap pli ca tion by a judge com pletely def er en tial to what ever was said by the leg is la tors -in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ersnor all the way-up com mon law re vi sion at the point of appli ca tion by a judge en tirely dis re spect ful to them. It is a dif fer ent meth od ol ogy, one that re quires a meet ing point, as the one pro vided by Waluchow him self in chap ter sixth, i.e. iden ti fy ing the com mu nity's con sti tu tional mo ral ity, by using "some thing like" John Rawls' "re flec tive equi lib rium" (223) -or even "some thing like" H.L.A. Hart's "crit i cal reflec tive at ti tude". 33 In the case of en trenched and writ ten Charters, one part is al ready fixed, as a sort of mod est pre-com mit ment, but drafted in open-tex ture and vague terms, which re quire to be re-fixed, as a fur ther com mit ment, i.e. adapted in caseby-case sce nar ios and from time to time by judges in a flexi ble man ner but that does not mean that they are completely free. In fact, they are not only bound to some ex tent by their pre vi ous de ci sions but also con strained or restrained by the legislators.
More over judges are not alone in this and space must remain open for leg is la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers, as well as other le gal of fi cials and op er a tors, such as law yers and cit i zens, to play a key role in other stages of the po lit i cal pro cess -or as Waldron puts it "in the cir cum stances of pol i tics". 34 Nev er the less, this com plex meth od ol ogy is com pat i ble with the one por trayed, by some ad vo cates of the stan dard case for Ju di cial Re view, such as Dworkin's "con struc tive in ter pre ta tion", "in teg rity model" and "moral read ing of the con sti tu tion", com pris ing "fit" and "moral value/worth", or John Hart Ely's "rep re sen ta tion rein force ment model", in cor po rat ing the rep re sen ta tion of minor i ties at the same time of bal anc ing the im pos si bil ity of a (strict) clause-bound interpretivism and the ne ces sity of dis cov er ing fun da men tal val ues. 35 Review (1980) . Cfr. United States v. Carolene Prod ucts Co. 304 U.S. 144 (1938), (espe cially its fa mous foot note 4, which paved the way to the War ren Court and in deed in spired Ely's "rep re sen ta tion re in force ment model"):
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There may be nar rower scope for op er a tion of the pre sump tion of con sti tu tion ality when leg is la tion ap pears on its face to be within a spe cific pro hi bi tion of the Con stitu tion, such as those of the first ten amend ments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em braced within the Four teenth...
It is un nec es sary to con sider now whether leg is la tion which re stricts those po lit i cal pro cesses which can or di narily be ex pected to bring about re peal of un desir able leg is la tion, is to be sub jected to more ex act ing ju di cial scru tiny un der the gen eral pro hi bi tions of the Four teenth Amend ment than are most other types of leg is la tion.
[…] Nor need we en quire whether sim i lar con sid er ations en ter into the re view of statutes di rected at par tic u lar re li gious ... or na tional ... or ra cial mi nor i ties ...: whether prej u dice against dis crete and in su lar mi nor i ties may be a spe cial con dition, which tends se ri ously to cur tail the op er a tion of those po lit i cal pro cesses orThis meth od ol ogy re quires keep ing a com plex bal ance not only be tween fix ity and flex i bil ity but also be tween fal li bil ity and fi nal ity. In that sense, it is -and must be-open to allow other ac tors, be sides judges, to play their re spec tive roles. It im plies a con stant re vi sion not merely at the point of ap pli ca tion but un de ni ably at any other point in time; and re quires the greater space avail able for a con struc tive and dis cur sive de lib er a tion and ex per i men ta tion about the ca pac i ties for or ganic growth within its lim its. In my opinion it is a meth od ol ogy, which al lows fal si fy ing some (mis)in ter pre ta tions and (mis)ap pli ca tions, count ing with mod i fy ing or re plac ing them with better in ter pre ta tions and ap pli ca tions -if not by the cor rect and right ones. It is some thing like the trial-and-er ror pro cess of the nat u ral, Sta re de ci sis is not, like the rule of res ju di ca ta, uni ver sal ine xo ra ble com mand. 'The rule of sta re de ci sis, though one ten ding to con sis tency and uni for mity of de ci sion, is not infle xi ble. Whet her it shall be fo llo wed or de par ted from is a ques tion en ti rely wit hin the dis cre tion of the court, which is again ca lled upon to con si der a ques tion once de ci ded.' Sta re de ci sis is usually the wise po licy, be cau se in most mat ters it is more im por tant that the ap pli ca ble rule of law be sett led than that it be sett led right. This is com monly true even whe re the error is a mat ter of se rious con cern, pro vi ded correc tion can be had by le gis la tion. But in ca ses in vol ving the Fe de ral Cons ti tu tion, whe re co rrec tion through le gis la ti ve ac tion is prac ti cally im pos si ble, this court has of ten ove rruled its ear lier de ci sions. The court bows to the les sons of expe rien ce and the for ce of bet ter rea so ning, re cog ni zing that 64 IMER B. FLORES di narily to be re lied upon to pro tect mi nor i ties, and which may call for a cor respond ingly more search ing ju di cial in quiry. the pro cess of trial and error, so fruit ful in the physi cal scien ces, is ap pro pria te also in the ju di cial func tion.
The pro cess of trail-and-er ror de scribes and ex plains how an er ror in leg is la tion is cor rected by ad ju di ca tion and vice versa, i.e. how a mis take in ad ju di ca tion is later on rec ti fied by courts them selves and pre vented from hap pen ing again by fur ther leg is la tion, con sti tu tional amend ments or reforms. It is worth men tion ing that the for mer does nei ther amount to "ju di cial leg is la tion" nor con sti tutes a "ju di cial usur pa tion", as Lon L. Fuller said: "The cor rec tion of ob vious leg is la tive er rors or over sights is not to sup plant the leg is la tive will, but to make that will ef fec tive." 37 In con trast the lat ter does nei ther amount to "leg is la tive ad ju di ca tion" nor con sti tutes a "leg is la tive usur pa tion", as Fuller might say: "The cor rec tion -and pre ven tion-of ob vi ous adjudicative er rors or oversights is not to supplant the judiciary will, but to make that will effective."
What I have in mind is that other in sti tu tions, with varying forces, come -and must come-into play to as sure the con stant and con tin u ous par tic i pa tion of judges and of legis la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers, and of other le gal of fi cials and op er a tors, such as law yers and cit izens, to the ex tent that con trary to the as sump tion "that the de ci sion of a su preme court to over turn leg is la tive de cisions is ab so lute… Yet… there is no ne ces sity here. It is pos si ble to have ju di cial re view with out grant ing judges the fi nal say." (12) In view of the fact that we do not know by all means whether leg is la tors got -or will get-it right, it is a good idea to have Ju di cial Re view to check them; but since we do not know of course whether judges got -or will getit right as well, it is a good idea to leave the pro cess open for fur ther re vi sion or to ask for fur ther institutional forces and requirements to come into play.
task of ren der ing law-de ter min ing de ci sions on our be halfdo not in fact have all the an swers when it co mes to moral rights and the im pact of our ac tions on them, and that we should do all we can to en sure that our moral short-sight edness and other lim i ta tions do not, in the cir cum stances of pol i tics and rule mak ing, lead us to mor ally un wor thy govern ment ac tion, un der stood, once again, as en com pass ing leg is la tive, ex ec u tive, and ju di cial acts.
Far from be ing based on the un war ranted as sump tion that we can have, in ad vance, all the right an swers to the con tro ver sial is sues of po lit i cal mo ral ity that might arise under Char ter chal lenges to gov ern ment ac tion, and that we are war ranted in im pos ing these an swers on those by whom we are suc ceeded, the com mon law con cep tion stems -and it is this which leads me to claim that it rep re sents a kind of Co per ni can rev o lu tion in our think ing-from the ex act op posite sen ti ment: from a rec og ni tion that we do not have all the an swers, and that we are well ad vised to de sign our po lit i cal and le gal in sti tu tions de lib er ately in ways that are sen si tive to this fea ture of our pre dic a ment.
VI. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL FORCES AND REQUIREMENTS: JUDGES, LEGISLATORS, OTHER LEGAL OFFICIALS AND OPERATORS
Any suc cess ful al ter na tive has not only to cope with fix ity and flex i bil ity but also deal with fal li bil ity and fi nal ity. Ju dicial Re view, es pe cially in a Con sti tu tional De moc racy, is nec es sary to check the fal li bil ity of the hu man con di tion, such as the one of leg is la tors. Why as sume that leg is la tors are in fal li ble? In ad di tion, leg is la tors do not have a fi nal say and leg is la tion does not count as fi nal ity. Why sup pose that leg is la tors are fi nal? 39 None the less, judges are also hu man, 67 THE LIVING TREE CONSTITUTIONALISM: FIXITY AND FLEXIBILITY 39 Waluchow, In clu sive Le gal Pos i tiv ism, su pra note 2, at 252: "We might grant that within an ideal world in which leg is la tors have suf fi cient time and en ergy to deal prop erly with hard cases, it would be better if they, and not judges, per formed the del i cate bal anc ing of so cial aims, pur poses, and prin ci ples such cases typ i cally re quire. But of course in our less than per fect world, leg is la tors have nei ther the time nor the en ergy to ac quaint them selves ad e quately with all the facts and all fal li ble as well and, as a re sult, not en ti tled to the fi nal say, ei ther. Hence, it is nec es sary to keep the pro cess open, i.e. re vis able in case-by-case sce nar ios and from-time-to time, by judges and leg is la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers, and of other le gal of fi cials and op er a tors, such as law yers and cit i zens. All of which re in forces the need for an ad e quate bal ance be tween fix ity and flex i bil ity. 40 To the ex tent that it is not true that the peo ple-then governs the peo ple-now or the dead hand of the past gov erns the liv ing will of those alive in the pres ent and those to be born in the fu ture, since it is re ally the peo ple over time who gov erns. Even if Thomas Jef fer son's fa mous state ment was di rected only to the idea that ev ery gen er a tion is en titled to have its own con sti tu tion, it pro vides a sound ar gument for the claim that it is the peo ple over time who governs: 41 Each ge ne ra tion is as in de pen dent of the one pre ce ding as that was of all which had gone be fo re. It has then, like them, a right to choo se for it self the form of go vern ment it be lie ves most pro mo ti ve of its own hap pi ness; con se quently, to accom mo da te to the cir cums tan ces in which it finds it self, that re cei ved from its pre de ces sors; and it is for the pea ce and good of man kind, that a so lemn op por tu nity of doing this every ni ne teen or twenty years should be pro vi ded by the Cons ti tu tion; so that it may be han ded on, pe rio di cal repairs, from ge ne ra tion to ge ne ra tion, to the end of time, if any thing hu man can so long en dure.
It is true not only that any gen er a tion is as in de pend ent as the next but also that ev ery gen er a tion has the same right to choose for it self. But for that pur pose a gen er a tion has to meet cer tain re quire ments to pass ei ther a leg is la tive bill with an ab so lute ma jor ity or a con sti tu tional amendment by a su pra-ma jor ity of two thirds in both cham bers of Con gress plus a su pra-ma jor ity of three fourths in the state leg is la tures or rat i fy ing con ven tions, as in the United States of Amer ica. In that sense, if those re quire ments are not met, it is not ac tu ally the case that the peo ple-then that gov ern the peo ple-now, but the lat ter which failed not to gov ern but to meet such re quire ments. Anal o gously, if a piece of leg is la tion is held un con sti tu tional, it is not re ally the case that the judge pre vails over the leg is la tor, but the lat ter which failed not to gov ern but to leg is late in a con stitu tional man ner. How ever, noth ing pre cludes the people-now from try ing to meet the re quire ments nor pre vents the leg is la tor from try ing to leg is late in a con sti tu tional mode, again and again. Con trary to the be lief that judges -or peo ple-then-are both fi nal and in fal li ble, it is clear that in a Con sti tu tional De moc racy, no one is fi nal and infal li ble, much less has an ab so lute or ul ti mate au thor ity. 42 In Waluchow's terms (173): "Charters trans form com plex is sues of po lit i cal mo ral ity… into «them-against-us» battles", when what is re quired is quite the op po site, i.e. "open dis cus sion, the abil ity to see the other side's point of view, and ul ti mately com pro mise and mu tual ac com mo da tion." If there ap pears to be dis agree ment all the way down, should not we start look ing for the ex ist ing agree ment -or for construct ing it-not only all the way up by judges but also all the way down, at least to some ex tent, by leg is la tors themselves? In fact, in his words: "This is one very good rea son why mod ern sys tems of gov ern ment opt for a di vi sion of la -69 THE LIVING TREE CONSTITUTIONALISM: FIXITY AND FLEXIBILITY 42 Vid. Bishop Benjamin Hoadly (ser mon be fore the Eng lish King in 1717) quoted by John Chipman Grey, "A Re al ist Con cep tion of Law", in Phi los o phy of Law, 50 (Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross eds., 3 rd ed., 1986): "Who ever hath an abso lute au thor ity to in ter pret any writ ten or spo ken laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver to all in tents and pur poses, and not the per son who first wrote or spoke them". Vid. also Jus tice Rob ert H. Jack son (con cur ring opin ion in) Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953): "We are not fi nal be cause we are in fal li ble, but we are infal li ble only be cause we are fi nal." bour be tween leg is la tures and courts." (262) What's more (269-270):
Seen in this light, judges and leg is la tors need not be seen to be in com pe ti tion with each other over who has more cour age or the better moral vi sion. On the con trary, they can each be seen to con trib ute, in their own unique ways, from their own unique per spec tives, and within their unique con texts of deci sion, to the achieve ment of a mor ally sen si tive and en lightened rule of law… ju di cial re view sets the stage for a "di alogue" be tween the courts and the leg is la ture… not as an im po si tion that thwarts the dem o cratic will but as one stage in the dem o cratic pro cess.
There fore, in a Con sti tu tional De moc racy, due to the fact that no one is fi nal or in fal li ble, what we need is nei ther a dik tat from one to the other or vice versa, nor a fi nal ar bi ter or ref eree, but a better un der stand ing of the di a lec ti cal and dialogical re la tion ship be tween courts and leg is la tures, includ ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers, as well as other legal of fi cials and op er a tors, such as law yers and cit i zens, in the search for the com mu nity's con sti tu tional mo ral ity -as a Rawlsian over lap ping con sen sus via re flec tive equilibrium. (221) As Waluchow puts it (225-226):
Why should judges in de cid ing moral ques tions un der a system of ju di cial re view be re quired, for rea sons of de moc racy, fair ness, and the like, to re spect the com mu nity's moral opin ions on the mat ter -as op posed to the com mu nity's true moral com mit ments in re flec tive equi lib rium? Why should they bend to the com mu nity's inauthentic wishes, not its authen tic ones?... [J]udges are not phi los o pher-kings with a pipe line to moral truth. But they may well be in a very good po si tion to de ter mine the re quire ments of a com mu nity's true moral com mit ments and au then tic wishes in par tic u lar cases. If this is so… then there is noth ing amiss in ask ing judges to en force these com mit ments and wishes against the mere opin ions and inauthentic wishes of a pos si bly misguided pub lic gripped by evaluative dis so nance. This is no 70 more prob lem atic than ac knowl edg ing the duty of re spon sible leg is la tors… to do the same.
In con se quence, Waluchow is ab so lutely right in sug gesting both that the Char ter need not to be con ceived as declar ing "The Hubristic Mes sage" (246): "We know which moral rights count, why they count, and the many com plex ways they count in the myr iad cir cum stances of pol i tics …"; and, that it may be say ing quite the op po site "The Hum ble Mes sage" (id.): "We do not know, with cer tainty, which moral rights count, why they count, and in what ways and to what de gree they count in the myr iad cir cumstances of pol i tics…".
The dif fer ent in sti tu tional forces and re quire ments that come into play to check not only the fal li bil ity and fi nal ity but also the fix ity and flex i bil ity, in the case of México, include:
2) Le gis la tion can be ve toed by the pre si dent and the veto can be ove rrid den by a two thirds su pra-ma jo rity (i.e. 66.66%) of the mem bers pre sent in both chambers of Con gress, also by dis cus sing and ap pro ving it one af ter anot her (ar ti cle 72), whe reas a cons ti tu tio nal amend ment or re form can not be ve toed, sin ce it appears to be al ready ove rru led ex ante by the two thirds re qui re ment; 44 3) Le gis la tion it self, a cons ti tu tio nal amend ment or reform, and their furt her ap pli ca tions by le gal of fi cials can be sub jec ted to Ju di cial Re view, but to have a gene ral (de ro ga tory) ef fect in some ca ses -as we al ready men tio ned-a vote of at least eight out of ele ven jus tices (i.e. 72.72%), that cons ti tu te the Su pre me Court at lar ge, or four out of five (i.e. 80%), that cons ti tu te each one of the two ben ches is re qui red (ar ti cle 105); 45 and 4) Le gis la tion it self, cons ti tu tio nal amend ments or reforms, can be pas sed -and sub jec ted to Ju di cial Review-again and again un til the cri te ria pre viously iden ti fied by the Su pre me Court as the com mu nity's cons ti tu tio nal mo ra lity are met.
To dem on strate how these dif fer ent forces and re quirements in ter act, let me point out one case. In 2006, be fore that year's gen eral elec tion, the two main me dia com pa nies were able to get out from the po lit i cal par ties rep re sented in both cham bers of Con gress two dif fer ent leg is la tive bills pro mul gated to en hance their du opo lis tic pow ers in exchange for a fa vour able treat ment for their can di dates, spe -72 IMER B. FLORES cially the pres i den tial ones. The pres i dent in of fice, at that time, ap par ently, who was also hos tage to the me dia in terests, de spite the call to veto the bills did not ex er cise such power. In the end af ter sev eral months, it was a mi nor ity of sen a tors, who suc cess fully brought the de ci sion to the Supreme Court. With one jus tice un der med i cal li cense and with other hav ing to ex cuse him self from tak ing part in the hear ings and in the de ci sion of the case, pre sum ably, un der pres sure from the me dia, the Su preme Court in June 7, 2007 over turned the bills for es tab lish ing a mo nop oly -in this case a du op oly-prohibited by article 28 of the Mexican constitution, with an eight to one decision.
While pre par ing new drafts of those leg is la tive bills to com ply with the cri te ria set by the Su preme Court, the current mem bers of Con gress, in both Cham bers, ap par ently, with the sup port of the pres ent Pres i dent, on Sep tem ber 13 of this same year, were able to pass a con sti tu tional amendment or re form, mainly, on elec toral cam paigns but re lated to those bills. The de ci sion al most unan i mously met the two thirds re quire ment and held in the op po site di rec tion of the pre vi ous bills, by lim it ing the power of the me dia dur ing elec tion years; re gard less of the me dia and some pri vate inter est groups op po si tion, who are cry ing that the amendment or re form im plies a form of cen sor ship and as such a limit to their free dom of ex pres sion. Since a con sti tu tional amend ment or re form can not be ve toed by the Pres i dent and its has al ready been rat i fied by the ab so lute ma jor ity of the leg is la tures of the states, those op pos ing to it can only bring its con sti tu tion al ity into ques tion, spe cif i cally, re garding its ap pli ca tion, to the Su preme Court, first, and even to the Inter-Amer i can Coun cil or Court on Hu man Rights, later on.
Clearly, as Waluchow has stressed: "judges are rel a tively in su lated from the pres sures to which leg is la tors are in ev ita bly sub ject." (255) If is true that the pres sures faced by the leg is la tive -and even by the ex ec u tive-can also reach the ju di ciary, it is also true that they are better po si tioned 73 to re sist them. How ever, noth ing pre cludes the ex ec u tive and the leg is la tive of re sist ing as well on be half of the true moral com mit ments of the community's constitutional moral ity. 
